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Gideon v. Wainright Supreme Court decision, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND
THE SUPREME COURT: THEN AND NOW
David S. Rudstein

A

fter examining the United States Reports containing the cases decided by the
Supreme Court during its 1887–88
term, one might conclude that the
United States in the late 1880s was
a law-abiding country with little
crime. Of the approximately 270 cases decided by the Court during that
term, only seven (2.6 percent) raised
issues of criminal law or procedure.
In contrast, in its most recently completed term, 2011–12, the Supreme
Court decided 76 cases, 22 (29 percent) of which involved issues of
criminal law or procedure.
What accounts for this dramatic
rise in the number (and percentage)

of criminal law or procedure cases
decided by the Supreme Court? No
one would deny that crime in the
United States has increased since
1888. But the true explanation for
the increased number of criminal
law and procedure cases decided by
the Supreme Court is the “constitutionalization” of criminal procedure.
When originally adopted in 1791,
the Bill of Rights (the first eight
amendments to the U.S. Constitution) placed limitations only upon
the Federal Government, not upon
the individual States. Consequently,
none of the rights provided in those
amendments—such as the protection against unreasonable searches
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and seizures (Fourth Amendment),
the guarantee against double jeopardy (Fifth Amendment), the privilege against self-incrimination (Fifth
Amendment), the right to counsel
(Sixth Amendment), the right to a
jury trial (Sixth Amendment), and
the right to confront hostile witnesses (Sixth Amendment)—applied in
criminal prosecutions brought in
state courts. Hence, an individual
convicted of a crime in a state court
could not challenge his or her conviction in the U.S. Supreme Court on
the ground that he or she had been
denied a right guaranteed in the Bill
of Rights. Many states did of course
have their own constitutional provisions guaranteeing various rights
to those accused of crime in their
own courts, but each state could interpret its own constitutional provisions, and many of these provisions
turned out to be less protective of
individual rights than their federal
counterparts. Moreover, since these
were rights guaranteed by state law,
rather than federal law, their alleged
violation did not raise a federal issue
that could be adjudicated by the U.S.
Supreme Court.
Even in 1888, after the adoption
of the Fourteenth Amendment—
which, among other things, prohibits
a State from abridging the “privileges and immunities” of United States
citizens (“Privileges and Immunities
Clause”) and from “depriving any
person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law” (“Due
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Process Clause”)—the Bill of Rights
still provided no protection to state
criminal defendants.
Shortly after the turn of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court
recognized that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protected some individual
rights from state infringement, including, perhaps, some safeguarded
by the Bill of Rights against National
action. Nevertheless, the Court expressly stated that if the Due Process
Clause protected such latter rights, it
was not because they were enumerated in the first eight amendments.
It explained that the Due Process
Clause protected only those rights
that are “the very essence of a scheme
of ordered liberty” and essential to “a
fair and enlightened system of justice.” In determining whether a particular safeguard met this standard,
the Court asked whether “a civilized system could be imagined that
would not accord the particular protection.” Applying this test, the Supreme Court held that several of the
protections contained in the Bill of
Rights, including the privilege against
self-incrimination and the right to a
grand jury indictment, did not apply
to the States. Even when the Court
held that a particular right enumerated
in the Bill of Rights fell within the
concept of due process, it frequently
concluded that the protection afforded against state infringement was less
than that afforded against infringement by the Federal Government—a
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prosecution’s case. The Connecticut
Supreme Court agreed; it reversed
the conviction (and life sentence)
and, despite Palko’s implicit acquittal
for that offense, ordered a new trial
for first-degree murder. At the second trial, a jury convicted Palko of
first-degree murder, and he was sentenced to death—a conviction and
sentence that the Supreme Court ultimately upheld against a claim that
Palko’s second trial had placed him
twice in jeopardy for first-degree
murder.
“watered-down” version of the right.
To illustrate, although the Fifth
Amendment guarantee against
double jeopardy precluded the
Government in a federal criminal
prosecution from appealing a jury
verdict—whether a conviction or
an acquittal—that protection did
not apply in state court proceedings.
Consequently, in the mid-1930s,
after a Connecticut jury considering a charge of first-degree murder
against Frank Palko convicted him
of second-degree murder (thereby
implicitly acquitting him of the original charge of first-degree murder),
the State, acting pursuant to a state
statute, sought review of the conviction. The State claimed the trial
judge had erred in instructing the
jury on first-degree murder and in
excluding certain evidence from the
Photo of Clarence Earl Gideon, 1961(?), State Archives of Florida, Florida Memory, RC12789.

T

hroughout the 1940s and 1950s,
the Supreme Court consistently
rejected the view, persuasively argued by Justice Hugo L. Black, that
the Fourteenth Amendment had “incorporated” the entire Bill of Rights
and made its provisions applicable to
the States to the same extent as they
applied to the Federal Government.
Even as late as 1961, despite the
Sixth Amendment’s guarantee that
an accused in a criminal prosecution “shall enjoy the right . . . to have
the Assistance of Counsel for his
defense,” an indigent being tried in
a state court for a non-capital felony
had no federal constitutional right to
have counsel appointed to represent
him or her. Thus, when Clarence
Earl Gideon, an indigent drifter being tried in a Florida state court for
breaking and entering a poolroom,
requested the trial court to appoint
counsel to represent him, the judge
could respond:
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Mr. Gideon, I am sorry, but I cannot appoint Counsel to represent
you in this case. Under the laws of
the State of Florida, the only time
the Court can appoint Counsel to
represent a Defendant is when that
person is charged with a capital offense. I am sorry, but I will have
to deny your request to appoint
Counsel to defend you in this case.

During the 1960s, however, under the leadership of Chief Justice
Earl Warren, the Supreme Court
adopted the position that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment “selectively incorporated” various provisions of the Bill of
Rights and made them applicable to
the States. Using this approach, the
Court held that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy, the
Sixth Amendment right to a jury
trial, and, in overturning Clarence
Earl Gideon’s conviction, the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel were
among the rights safeguarded from
infringement by the states. In 1968,
the Court explained that it had reformulated its test for determining
whether a particular provision of
the Bill of Rights was incorporated
by the Fourteenth Amendment. It
stated:
The recent cases . . . have proceeded upon the valid assumption that state criminal processes
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are not imaginary and theoretical
schemes but actual systems bearing
virtually every characteristic of the
common-law system that has been
developing virtually contemporaneously in England and in this country.
The question thus is whether given
this kind of system a particular procedure is fundamental—whether,
that is, a procedure is necessary to
an Anglo-American regime of ordered liberty. [Emphasis added.]

Today, virtually all of the provisions of the Bill of Rights safeguarding the rights of a criminal defendant apply to the States (the lone
exception being the right to an indictment). As a result, the Supreme
Court each term receives hundreds
of petitions requesting it to review
a state-court conviction alleged to
have been obtained in violation of
the defendant’s federal constitutional
rights, and each year the Court decides 20 or so cases involving such
issues, a large percentage of the
number of cases it decides each term
with written opinions. ◆
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